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Volume 6, Number 4


May, 1958

TWO-STONE HANDICAP FUSEKI

By Minoru Kitani, 9th Dan

Part Two


GAME III



•4 is played one line closer to °1 than in the previous games. This is no longer an extension. Since the upper right side is not white territory *4 cannot be called a wedge play, but after •10 it can be seen that the result is nearly the same. Since 4 is in effect a wedge play, it may be concluded that this play will lead to a simple line of play that is unstrained. In Game II 4 was played one line higher and severe fighting ensued. It may seem strange that the advance of one line results in easier line of play, but if *4 is considered as a wedge the above results are

quite natural.

°5 is played as there is room to extend to Rll after °8. °l of Figure l is too narrow and white should not adopt this attitude in a two stone game. °2 may also be played at Rl2, which is the great knight's play with relation to the upper corner and is considered excellent fuseki style.



*6 is more effective at R15 than at 016. The result of a play at 016 is shown in Figure 2. The principle here is that white is forced into a position which is too narrow. In the basic diagram °9 should be one line further from the two stone wall °5-°7.

°9. Instead of the main line white might play the variation of Figure 3. White gains in area in the lower right, but army around R14 loses its base.

"ll may be construed as aiming to direct the play through "15. Even by itself this turn play is good. Imagine the position if black occupies this spot.

•12 is forced.

(continued on page 63)

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GOOD NEWS . . .

With this issue, the editors have nailed down Volume 6 of the Go Journal. We understand from the letters and subscriptions received that readers have taken a good measure of profit and enjoyment from these 64 pages. As a matter of fact, we have improved a stone or two ourselves.

Volume 7 will follow close on the heels of Volume 6, beginning with a big 32-page Numbers 1 and 2 combined. purpose of this double issue is to give you a 20-page chapter from Takagawa's Principles of Fuseki, kindly made available to us from R. Newlander's Grand Strategy Game of Go. We have long felt the need to publish a substantial study in opening strategy which would not be atomized by the magazine format; this work has been chosen because it provides the most advanced discussion in the simplest language. We think it will be equally interesting to players of all ranks.

In Volume 7, even more room will be devoted to articles written for beginners. There will be more in the Raising Your Strength series, as many readers have requested. Future subjects will include: How to Play White for the First Time; When and Why to Count; What Do I Need to Win?

All readers who enjoy the Go Journal are urged to ask all Go-playing friends to subscribe. We have found that many players are simply waiting to be asked. May we remind readers that the Go Journal is produced by volunteer labor; the \$4.00 you extract from your friends will be plowed back into more pages for your benefit.

In the last issue we mentioned that Mr. John Goodell of the Riverside Press, Minneapolis, has sold over 3,500 Go sets through direct mail advertising.

We must all pause before this astonishing fact, and we must all admire Mr. Goodell for his energy and imagination. Moreover, Mr. Goodell is working with the American Go Association to insure that these 3,500 new players will continue to play the game, and we hope that a good many will subscribe to the Journal.

At the annual meeting of the American Go Association last January, ways and means were considered to reach new Go players, and it was decided to publish a 48-page book of selections from the Go Journal. Articles on Joseki, Handicap Fuseki, End Game, Raising Your Strength, and others most useful to beginners were chosen.

This book will soon be in print. All veteran readers of the Go Journal will receive a copy without charge when you renew your subscription later this year. Since most readers do not have complete files, we believe you will find it very handy to have this basic material assembled in one place.

At the annual meeting of the American Go Association, held January 24, 1958 at the Nippon Club, 7 East 96th St., New York City, the following officers were elected for 1958:

Honorary President: Karl Davis


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
SAKATA - TAKAGAWA GAME


In this game between Sakata, 9th Dan, and Takagawa, 8th Dan, Sakata played white with a komi of 4-1/2 points. Each player had a time limit of four hours. Comments are by Takagawa.



| Black 1 Q16- 3 Q4 5 C4 7 G4 9 D6 11 D7 13 F6 15 C14 | White 2 D17 4 E3 6 K3 8 E5 10 D8 12 C8 14 G2 16 D12 | Black 19 D16 21 C18 23 E16 25 B18 27 F15 29 F14 31 E17 33 L16 | White 20 B17 22 D15 24 C15 26 G16 28 G15 30 D14 32 F18 34 È18 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 15 C14 17 C17 | 18 C16 | 35 D18 | 36 B16 |
| 15 C14 | 16 D12 | 33 L16 | 34 E1 |

*ll is a play which has recently become popular. The usual line is shown in Figure 1.





°12 may also be played at E8 as shown in Figure 2. The variation of Figure 2 is from a game between Takagawa and Go Seigen. °3 is very important as it provides white with the plays at a and b in answer to °6 at G5.


*13. If this played at F7 then white should answer at G5.

*15 is a standard play. If this is played at C15 then white has the pincer play at *2 of Figure 3.

°16 is usually played at C16 to secure the corner. In answer to °1 Fig. 4 the high play at °2 is correct.

17 through 26 are joseki.


°28. When °16 is played at Dll then it is usual for °28 to be played at Dl4 as shown in Figure 5.



°32. If white plays the extension to L16, then black should answer at G18 as shown in Figure 6. White would have a perfect form in this position if °a, b, °1.

°36 saves one stone and prepares to attack the black armies.


| Black | White | Black | White |
|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| 37 El3 | 38 D13 | 49 E15 | 50 J13 |
| 39 H13 | 40 K15 | 51 H15 | 52 J14 |
| 41 L15 | 42 Kl4 | 53 H17 | 54 J17 |
| 43 K16 | 44 Hl4 | 55 F17 | 56 G17 |
| 45 G14 | 46 J16 | 57 G18 | 58 H16 |
| 47 F8 | 48 F16 | 59 H18 | 60 J18 |



*47 doesn't seem right here. Instead black should play at the point of *54, J17, and start an attack against the white stones. In Figure 7 *5 is a good play and the position is poor for white. The correct play after *3 of the above is shown in Figure 8, where *3 is answered by black filling at J16. In Figure 9 *2 is the correct answer to *1, and later black should play at a.


°48 was played to protect against a black play at G17. See Figure 10.

*53-*61 make black safe in the corner, but as a result the black stones around L16 are isolated and weak. This is the outcome of the poor play at *47.




| Black | White | Black | White |
|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| 61 E19 | 62 016 | 79 P15 | 80 015 |
| 63 Q14 | 64 Q17 | 81 012 | 82 Pl2 |
| 65 R17 | 66 P17 | 83 014 | 84 N13 |
| 67 R18 | 68 N14 | 85 N12 | 86 Pl4 |
| 69 R10 | 70 03 | 87 Q13 | 88 Ml2 |
| 71 Q6 | 72 PlO | 89 Mll | 90 Ml4 |
| 73 M13 | 74 Rll | 91 L12 | 92 L14 |
| 75 M17 | 76 Pl4 | 93 Q11 | 94 Q10 |
| 77 P13 | 78 013 | 95 R12 | 96 R9 |
| | | 97 S11 | 98 S10 |

°62 may also be played at the point of °63 as is shown in Figure 11. Since in Figure 11 °3 is a strong play black might play at <u>a</u> instead of at °2.



°72 is good play as this is a very important point for both sides. You will see that if black plays at this point that he develops a very strong side formation.

*73. Black might instead play at *1, Figure 12. The variation through *10 is standard play. Now the following count may be made: White, upper side (note that the monkey jump to 019 must be considered) 23 points, left side 20 points, the lower side roughly estimated at 10 points (this is difficult because of



possible black plays at H2 and M3), for a total count of 53; Black, upper left corner 10 points, the upper right corner of Figure 12 24 points, both lower corners 10 points, for a total of 44 points. Therefore black starts a counterattack with *73.

°74 ignores °73 and invades at Rll. If white defends at Ml4 see Figure 13. °10 is necessary to safeguard the white army and then black protects the side with °11. This variation is good for

black.

*75 starts an attack against the

white army around P17.


*77-°92 involves a big fight. In the sequence °88 is very important. If this is played at the point of 90 instead of at °88 see Figure 14. After *8 the white army on the upper left side is lost.

°98. A count after this play is as follows: White, upper side 25, left side 20, for a total of 45; Black, upper right side 25, upper left corner 10, for a total of 35. Since black is still behind he must take 20 points in the lower right hand corner in order to win.

*99. In view of the above count *99 cannot be used to fill at Rll. Therefore black starts to attack the white stones around PlO with Q8 and a big Ko fight starts with *103 and *104.


A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T 19 18 18 17 17 16 16 15 15 14 14 13 13 1.2. 12 11 11 Figure

| | | | T 1 ,1 |
|---------|---------|----------------|---------|
| Black | White | Black | White |
| 99 Q8 | 100 P8 | 123 Q15 | 124 Rll |
| 101 P7 | 102 08 | 125 Dll | 126 R7 |
| 103 Q9 | 104 Rll | 127 S5 | 128 Cll |
| 105 E10 | 106 D10 | 129 R10 | 130 Q7 |
| 107 R10 | 108 Q3 | 131 N18 | 132 Kll |
| 109 R3 | 110 R4 | 13 3 R8 | 134 R11 |
| 111 R5 | 112 S4 | 135 L3 | 136 Q12 |
| 113 P3 | 114 Q2 | 137 K2 | 138 02 |
| 115 P4 | 116 P2 | 139 812 | 140 P6 |
| 117 S3 | 118 R11 | 141 07 | 142 N7 |
| 119 019 | 120 Pll | 143 06 | 144 N6 |
| 121 R10 | 122 R15 | 145 05 | 146 M3 |
| | | | |



*109. If black instead fills at Rll and ends the ko fight white then would build territory in the corner by playing the variation of Figure 15. Black would play at 7 in an effort to build territory in the center, but this is very difficult.

The count after *7, Figure 15 is: White, upperside 25, left side 20, lower side 25, for a total of 70; Black, right side 30 (the possibility of a white play at the weak point of R13 must be considered), center 30, upper left corner 10, lower left corner rough estimate of 5, for a total of 75 points. When the komi of 4-1/2 points is considered this line of play is not good as the count is too close. Also white obtains sente. Therefore *109 of the main line was selected as the best line.



Page 53

en fill at R11. If black played this then white would play at the point of 117, black would answer at N5 and would have the threat of N3. This line is superior to Figure 15 as N5 and N3 give black a means to enlarge the center.

*119 is a doubtful play. After *120 the five black stones in the center are

cut off.

*l29 is not correct as this gives white a chance to play *30 and later *40 with the result that white is safe on the lower side. Better for black would have been *l29 M3 and then either N2 or J2.

°136. It is correct for white to end the ko fight as black has many available ko threats.

*139 is a big play for black, but he can also play at N2 instead. This is shown in Figure 16.





Figure 16

°148. The count after this play is: White, left side 20, right side 12, the upper side 3, the lower left 5, and the lower right 5 for a total of 45; Black, upper right corner 20, upper left corner 10, and the lower right corner 10 for a total of 40. Since black can make some territory in the lower corner the game is very close.

*159 is a slow play. This should

have been played at N4.

*199 is not correct. El instead is the correct point. After this the line



201 - 224

might be 200 A2, 201 E2, and 202 Bl. Black now has sente to play at 199 (G9), thus capturing the two stones at G7 and G8.

°200 eliminates the possibility of a

black play at El.

°224 is played to save these stones. The result is a large semeai (a position in which two contiguous chains are each struggling to kill one another, the life of one depending on the capture of the other.), but black loses by one play and therefore resigned. If black had played at El the game would have been close.




ADVANCED STRATEGY

By Kaku Takagawa


Part III

(THE STUDY OF GAME ONE is now to be concluded as both players turn their attention to the lower left corner.)



Black 57 is urgently required at this stage as white threatens to consolidate his territory with °l of Diagram 28, after which white may be somewhat ahead in territory. Black may of course be able to reduce white's territory with the variation shown in Diagram 28.

The variation after *57 through *63 is forced. This line destroyed white's




territory and at the same time severed the connection between the white groups so that a play at El6 will threaten the white group in the upper left corner.

If 58 is played at the point of 63 (E7) in an attempt to cut the connection between the black groups, black will answer either at B5 or C4. This is obviously poor for white. Similarly a white play at the point of 63 instead of 62 will result in the loss of 58, after which white will not be able to continue the fight here.

The fact that white's territory has been reduced is not important, for if this line is compared with the development through °5 of Diagram 28, the reader will find a difference of less than 50 points. In Diagram 28 white loses the initiative, while in the basic diagram black gives it up. The big thing here is the cut between the two white groups, which affected the entire course of the game.

White 66 is played with the dual purpose of attacking the black group while securing points in this area. It should be noted that °64 must be played in preparation for °66. If this play is omitted, black will play at 4 of Diagram 29 instead of playing at °69 of the basic diagram.



Black 8, Diagram 29, makes things difficult for white. If white tries to save the two stones above 8, then black plays at either <u>a</u> or <u>b</u> will be serious threats to white as black has prevented a connection with the stones on the left side. Black also has the sente play at the line below 7.

Diagram 30 shows the result when °64 and °65 are added to the variation shown in Diagram 29. Even if black plays at a the white stones cannot be captured. In


the discussion about Diagram 29 it was stated that the play below white 7 was a sente play for black; here, however, this is not true as white may play at the key point b. The difference between these two references is the firm checking play at 8, Diagram 29.

Because of the above black 69 is inevitable. For black to play where he cannot make territory is not good, but still this line is better than Diagram 30.


Black reduces white's territory and strengthens his own sphere of influence with *73 and *75. At this state of the game all of black's positions are stable and the territorial balance is in favor of black, and thus the game should be won by him.

If white fails to answer *75, black will advance with a play at the point three lines below 75, with the result that white will not have room to form territory. However, if white answers at the point two lines below 75, this would be assuming a passive role. At this stage of the game, white must find strong plays. White 78 of the basic diagram is such a play, but first white must prepare for this by playing at 76. Black 77 is an effective play. If black relaxes or becomes careless at this stage of the game he may lose.

Black 79 may appear to be a weak placement, but if he plays J10 instead, then °L11, °J11, °K12.



At the time, *81 seemed to be the After °F16, *D16, white must make a White 82 of the basic diagram is an



White would be aiming at a potential cut at Ml4. Even if black secures each group he cannot hope to gain any advantage in this area.

best move, but black should have given more thought to this play, as may be seen from the moves through 100 of the next diagram. Instead of 81, black had the chance to cut at E16.

connection with °E15. To capture the two white stones with sente is a big gain for black. Then black could play at 81 with a more clearly defined win.

orthodox move. If white played instead at the point of 86 he would lose points in spite of making a connection.

With the moves through °88, white strengthened his thin formations in this area, while gaining a sizeable number of points. The reason for this is that white 82 was played at exactly the proper moment. El6 and Dl6 were vital points, which black could have utilized, and yet because of 81 black lost his chance to play here. Thus black suffered a double disadvantage.

Black 89 is a play at the head of two stones and therefore it would seem that this placement could not be questioned. Post-game thought indicated that this play should have been given more thought and that 89 should have been played at K8. White does not have an effective countermeasure to this move, which is an ideal play.

White 92 seems to be just an ordinary play, but actually this is a very skill-ful move by which white leads the play into a more profitable area. If instead white played 92 at the point of 94 the continuation would be *95, *96, and black would capture six white stones with the cut at 1, Diagram 31.

The variation of Diagram 32 is not successful for black. After °6 it is doubtful if black can capture the white






Diagram 32

army. In this situation it is not a question of an attack or a pursuit, it is capture that black is after. For this reason if black fails he also loses ground in the game. If white plays at a he will secure eyes quite easily.

Black 93 was inevitable. After °96, black was no longer able to play at the



Basic Diagram 101 - 121



point of 98 to cut off the white stones. White 100 may seem like an aimless play, but black also is not in a position to make any effective plays. Thus white not only secured eyes, but also gained a substantial number of points. In this situation the tide of battle became rather confused.

If black tries to prevent white from forming eyes by play at a, white should answer at Sll. After "Sll, if black continues "Sl3, white should answer "Sl5. If black answers "Sll with "Sl4, white should play at "S9. If black does not succeed, then he is in danger himself.

Returning to the basic diagram, 'l is forced. This is the result of the poor play at 89 of the previous diagram. It is easily proved that black suffers a severe loss if this play is omitted.

At this stage of the game, things are difficult for black as he has lost the initiative. In fact, black is actually in a dangerous position if white adopts the line shown in Diagram 33 instead of the play at 2 of the basic diagram. White would follow up Diagram 33 with a play at a in the basic diagram.

White 2 is a very appropriate move, but it is too heavy, and required more thought on white's part. Black 3, etc., was played to prevent the variation of Diagram 34. These plays allowed black to play at 11 and 13, which gave black a certain win.

The winner and loser are clearly known at this stage. However, since many of the readers may not be satisfied a continuation will be given. *l corresponds with 2l of the Basic Diagram 100-121.

The development through 15 shows that moves 16, etc., of the previous diagram were not successful and in fact were actually a loss for white.

(continued on page 62)

RAISING YOUR STRENGTH

III. Staying Out of Trouble

THIS IS THE THIRD article in a series designed to help beginners improve their Go playing. The series on Raising Your Strength does not pretend to be authoritative, nor comprehensive, nor exhaustive, but it is intended as a measure of help where help is most needed. The editors of the Go Journal have based these articles on the agreed principles found in more advanced studies, both published and unpublished, that are available in English translation.

IN YOUR CAMPAIGN to raise your strength as a Go player, you must learn to win large handicap games against stronger players---and do this consistently. You will only be able to do this when you have learned to stay out of trouble.


The nine handicap stones are placed in positions where they are the least help to you---taken by themselves, one at a time. They don't surround territory; they don't form walls. Black's aim is to unite these stones into groups to form solid positions. White will try to involve Black in hand to hand fighting before he can do this. In close fighting, the over-all advantage of the handicap stones is lost, and White can rely on his experience to win most of the smaller engagements.

No matter how much you enjoy these little struggles, you should avoid them. Your main task is to hold your opponent at arm's length, and club him to death with your positional advantage. If you cannot enjoy a game based on this coldblooded strategy, then this article is not for you.

Staying out of trouble with a clearcut strategy is the royal road to raising your strength. Mistakes can be detected and analyzed. But the other type of dog-eat-dog play can never be completely analyzed, even by masters, and your opinion on where you made your error will prove to be an illusion in the next encounter.


The Use of Joseki


The first step toward staying out of trouble is to learn a few corner openings very well. This will do three things for you: first, you will begin with a sound base in each corner. Second, you will lead out toward the center to connect with other groups, and prevent white from seizing large territory there. Third, you will learn standard forms of play that will be useful in tactics throughout the game.



The joseki of Diagram 1 is one of the most useful for this purpose: it confines white to certain well-known routes which you will find discussed in detail in Volume[®]1, No. 2 of the Go Journal. Black leads out to the center with [®]2 and [®]4, yet at the same time puts such firm pressure on White that White cannot leap to seize the corner. If he does, it is only by sacrificing the [®]1-[®]3 position. This sequence of moves occurs again and again throughout masters' games, and not only in the corners.

The variation of Diagram 1-b shows the beginning of a close fight which Black will win if he knows all the details (*12 is the key play). But the beginner should not play this line if he





wants to stay out of trouble. Black can thwart the aggressive intent of °7 by the much simpler line of Diagram 1-c. Black builds a very large corner on the fourth line, while White is left with a meager catch of two stones. The simplicity of *8 and *10 recommends this type of play as a prime resource for staying out of trouble.


The joseki of Diagram 2----from an even game opening---is very often useful in other parts of the board. It is common for Black or White to approach a hostile formation from a distance of two spaces, as shown in Diagram 3. If Black follows the standard form as illustrated here, he builds an attractive, strong formation.


Approach from a Distance

One of the most important rules for staying out of trouble is to approach a white position from a distance of two spaces. From this beachhead, you may then play directly against White, as in Diagram 2, but seldom from a greater distance.

Even when this means a small extension for black, it is correct play. It of Diagram 4 is a very important play which you may hesitate to make at the proper time. But the vital nature of this point becomes apparent by replacing I with I. If White plays here, his formation is no longer insecure. He does not have to run, but Black must guard against an invasion of the right hand corner.

Unfortunately, the beginner can't always restrain his adventurous spirit--and feels compelled to play 'l of Diagram 5-a against the lone white stone.
This is exactly what he should not do,
and the ensuing diagrams illustrate the






disadvantage of placing one's head in the lion's mouth.

In Diagram 5-b, White chooses to play on top of Black, for the sake of strong center influence. In 5-c, he goes below Black: after *5, White can establish himself at a or b, or push through with c or d. Black may have anticipated either of these. But White has a more ingenious way of getting Black into trouble: *2 of Diagram 5-d is calculated to make Black sweat.

In Diagram 5-d, we assume that Black is fairly adroit at this kind of infighting. By exchanging 5 for 2, he may feel that he has the best of it. But the sequel of 5-e is what we are likely to see. Black does not pick up °2, as he sees no immediate threat. But at some later stage in the game, when Black is counting on the lower right corner for eyes and points, White slips in with °10. Relying on the weakness at a, he proceeds to establish himself at °18. It goes without saying that he does not make this approach if the Black wall on the fourth line will be of any value.



suggest that you avoid, by playing Diagram 3 as a matter of course.

The Diagonal Fallacy

After Black has learned that he should not play directly against White, he is tempted to play diagonally against him. This appears to be much safer, and further away. But is it? Diagram 6 shows the futility of this approach: Black is persecuted to the breaking point, and must still protect against °a. Black's own bad move is the stake on which he is pinned; how much better off he would have been to play N3 instead!





Diagram 6


The essential fault in this position is formed by moves *1-°4, where the two black stones are "hit on the head" by °4. Black's position is considered very weak in this situation.

The Scissors

Yet despite all of Black's precautions, there are times when White can force the issue, and involve Black in a cutting, slashing fight. In certain situations, Black must fight or resign his territory, and lose by default.


Here again a well-known joseki gives help in this predicament: "Scissors" Joseki of Diagram 7, (discussed at length in Vol. 2, No. 3 of the Go Journal). White usually plays this to see if Black knows the answer; but if Black does make the correct response to °5, White has only a fair position. The right play is at a, and Diagram 7-b shows the consequence.





The rule here is: when caught in a scissors, be the first to double a stone.


In Diagram 8, White slips a stone under Black's handicap .point, in a shrewd bid to create complications. Black must play 2, or vacate the field, and 3 completes the white intention. Yet if



Black follows the rule with *4 of Diagram 8-b, he has nothing to fear (a, b, or c would all be possible alternatives.)

White must now make the best of a bad situation. If he leads out his upper stone (Diagram 8-c), he sacrifices the lower one. If he plays °5 on the third line (Diagram 8-d), then Black's 6 and 8 claim a very large corner, and Black can still play at a to divide the White stones into two groups.

What Black should not do is to attack one of the White stones (as in Diagram 8-e). Black thus divides his stones in-



to three armies, which does him no good whatsoever. Moreover, he has created a terribly complex situation, and the odds are very much against him in such a struggle. Situations of this type seem simple at first--but as you try one line





Diagram 8-e

and another, you will discover that the possibilities are inexhaustible -- and most of them favor the player who is first to double a stone. The reader is challenged to try his hand.

Summary

The most important conclusion that the reader can draw from this discussion is a determination to stay out of trouble. If he sincerely wishes to play a positional game, he may keep the following suggestions in mind:

- 1. Start from a few well-known joseki, where White is limited in his choice of play. Try to use these forms throughout the game.
- 2. Approach enemy formations from a distance of two spaces.
- 3. Keep your stones united in as few armies as possible. When caught in complications, try to extend in straight lines.



SACRIFICE STONE TACTICS

By Kensaku Segoe

Basic Position 5 (Diagram 5-A)




Diagram 5-A

Diagram 5-B

This joseki is frequently used. is played when the ladder formation in the upper right hand corner is favorable and aims at developing strength in the center of the board. This study will show how to use sacrifice stone tactics in conjunction with 'll.

The sequence shown in Diagram 5-B appears to be better than in 5-A, but this view is incorrect. The continuation in 5-C looks good for B, but actually °l is a sacrifice stone played for gain on the outside.

°l of Diagram 5-D is an improved line of play and is now considered correct. To play °5 C6 would be poor. °6 is forced. This variation allows W to form a sound group with outside strength. If B played *6 C6, W would crush the Black stones by playing at C3.

When B wishes to avoid the sequence of Diagram 5-D he may play the line seen in Diagram 5-E. °7 is played with the idea of playing at either H2 or H4, depending upon Black's answer.

Should W fail to answer 'll of Diagram 5-A, B has the threat shown in Diagram 5-F as 1. This then threatens a







Diagram 5-C





cut at F4 or at 6 and W cannot defend against both these plays. However, the variation given in Diagram 5-B does not include this threat.

Basic Position 6 (Diagram 6-A)




"l is a two-space extension. "2 is a routine play, which is too defensive. Does Black have a better play?

In Diagram 6-B, *2 would be a much more aggressive play, as it threatens to invade at <u>a</u>.

Diagram 6-C shows a line which is better for B than Diagram 6-A. The position after 16 is well balanced and is satisfactory for both sides.

*2 of Diagram 6-D is forceful play, requiring a W answer. If *3 D7, then *4 D6, and B has expanded his potential sphere of *influence. This variation,



which gives B a very strong corner, has been used successfully by a high ranking player.





Diagram 6-E shows a sacrifice stone technique, and 6-F is the natural continuation, in which B develops a very efficient position. Compared to this, *2 of Diagram 6-A appears to be rather weak play.



Advanced Strategy

(continued from page 57)


Black 17, etc., were careful and moderate moves and properly played in view of black's superior game. Black 31 was forced, as the reader may determine for himself. As the result, the outcome of this game was rather close. Black won by four points.



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Two-Stone Handicap Fuseki

(continued from page 49)





°13 is a vital point. White cannot afford to allow black a turn play at Pll.

*14 is forced. If black should play elsewhere then the variation of Figure 4 would make things difficult for black. In the main line black has the threat of a later attack at N12.

°15 is in line with the strategy previously mentioned. For White to play 15 at °1, Figure 5, would be wishful thinking. Black would certainly play the variation of Figure 6.

In Figure 6 °3 is the best reply to black's play at °2. White then seeks compensation in the corner. °12 is the most effective reply to °11. For black to attempt to contain °1 by playing on top of this stone (F4) would be a rather mild play and too cautious. The reader will see that if black makes a solid po-







sition on the lower side by supplementing 2 with 12 he need not worry about white's outward expansion from 1. 12 not only menaces the base of white's position in the corner, but also negates the influence of 11 of the main line. If instead of 12 black prosaically plays at F4 white would answer at M3 and later black would be forced to make a supplemental play on the lower side.

*16. The value of this play is clear when this position is compared with Figure 5. This play is good as black will be able to play at either of the two big points ClO or Kl7. Black is also waiting for the opportune moment to invade the lower right corner with a play at M3.

*18 may be played as an extension and close up play as shown by *1, Figure 7. In such an event black must expect white to reply at *2 and *4. Against a wedge play such as *17 of the main line if one closes up on one side, the answer will be an extension on the other side. In many positions there is no need to close up immediately. Refer also to Figures






8 and 9. After °4, Figure 7 black may play either the variation of Figure 8 or Figure 9. Since both of these lines are apt to lead to complications °18 and °20 of the main line are preferred.

°19. Should white fail to play at 19, black would play one line lower and then black's upper position would be ideal in spite of white being able to extend toward the lower side. °19 at F17 would be answered by black at D14 and white would experience difficulties as a result of the isolated stone on the left side.

°21 is played to avoid a black play at N12. A black play at N12 would not only attack the white army, but also at same consolidate the upper side.

*22. In a pattern such as this where both sides are competing to jump out, it is always desirable to jump one ahead. *22 increases black's center influence and enables black to watch in all directions. This is a splendid play, even if it has no immediate effect on the mutual pressing of the two groups. If *22 were played instead at C5 then white would answer at L11 and the center influence of both sides would be tremendously effected.

°23 is in tune with °21. This is certainly an effective order of play, but of course white's lower group is not perfect with its present form. In other words this is a sphere of influence and should not be considered territory. One of the advantages of the rather quiet °22 is thus to menace the lower side. Also the importance of °16 should be



noted. However, in spite of this threat it's unsound for white to play 23 low so that black would not have room for an invasion.


*24 may also be used to close up at *1, Figure 10. The resulting joseki is shown in Fig. 10. After *15, Fig. 10, white will perhaps guard at a.

°25 is played because it is still considered large for black to close up at C8. Not only is there an actual gain or loss of territory according to who plays first, but in addition if black plays first the situation would be unbearable for white because of the threat of an invasion at C12. Even after °25 of the main line there is room for an invasion at a, but white can answer at b seeking compensation in the corner.

*26 is played to enhance the upper side formation and at the same time also forces *27 and *28.

On the lower side black could play at M5, followed by white at M3 and black P2. These stones cannot be captured by white. White has the opportunity for a future play at c.

After *26 and *27 the position is considered to be favorable for black.



21 4